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What Will We Lose If the Trial Vanishes? 
 




 The disappearance of the American trial presents a major crisis for the legal 
profession today.  One of the archetypes of American culture is a lawyer addressing a jury 
on a matter of public importance.  Our own self-understanding as a profession in a 
democratic society has always included a prominent place for the trial lawyer’s craft.  We 
are now in danger of relegating this powerful image to old movies and television drama. 
My focus here is on the meaning of the death of the American trial.  I ask the simple 
questions, “If the American trial is dying, so what? What difference does it make?”  I 
answer that it makes a great deal of difference.  The trial is one of the great achievements 
of our public culture, that it stands in a rich tradition, and that it is much admired by most 
of those in a position to know: trial lawyers, judges, and the social scientists who have 
studied it carefully.  And so my goal is not primarily to explain the trial’s demise.  
Explanations are dangerous in matters of political morality because they easily slide into 
one form or other of determinism.  Determinisms make us resigned or complacent, when 
we should be activist.  In our legislature and in our courts, we have the power to take 
appropriate action to resuscitate the trial, to bring it back to life.  This essay, like my earlier 
work on this subject,1 is an appeal, not primarily an explanation.   
 
                                                 
 Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law 
1 ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL (2009). 
 2
 The loss of the trial would wound our legal order and our democratic government 
seriously. As federal district court judge William Dwyer put it, “The jury trial is the canary 
in the mineshaft” of our democracy.   “[I]f it goes, if our people lose their inherited right to 
do justice in court, other democratic institutions will lose breath too.”2  If the trial dies, “it 
would not be by a tyrant’s ax, but a long and scarcely noticed process of decay.  
Indifference, in the long run, is deadlier than any coup, and democratic institutions are 
easily lost through neglect, followed by decline and abandonment.”3  Or, as federal 
appellate judge Damon Keith put it more succinctly, “democracy dies behind closed 
doors.”4  That is true whether they are the closed doors of a judge’s chambers where he is  
disposing of a case summarily, or of a conference room where a sealed settlement is 
reached, or of an arbitration which is not public, or of an office where an unreviewable 
decision of a corporate or government official takes place.  As a California appellate court 
put it, “Participants in secret proceedings quickly lose their perspective, and the quality of 
the proceedings suffers as a consequence….Popular justice is public justice.”5  As the late 
Milner Ball so well understood, the formality and sometimes ritual character of the trial 
embody a respect for each party, however lowly he or she may be in the ordinary business 
of life, and stand as a bulwark against a purely instrumental treatment of persons as a mere 
means to some predetermined end to be pursued bureaucratically.6 
 
                                                 
2 WILLIAM L. DWYER, IN THE HANDS OF THE PEOPLE: THE TRIAL JURY’S ORIGINS, 
TRIUMPHS, AND FUTURE IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2002), 153. See also RANDOLPH N. 
JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM (2003). 
3 Id.  
4 Detroit Free Press v. Ashkroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002). 
5 Oxnard Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 83, 95 (2nd Dist. 1968), quoted in MILNER BALL, 
THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW: A THEOLOGICAL, HUMANISTIC VIEW OF LEGAL 
PROCESS (1982), 46. 
6 BALL, supra note 5.  
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 In this essay, I will do four things.  I will summarize the evidence that the trial is 
dying. I will remind you very briefly what a trial is.  I will describe our best guesses as to 
why the trial is dying.  Finally, I will enumerate the ways in which the trial’s death would  
inflict a serious wound on our public culture. 
 
II. What the Numbers Say  
 I review the quantitative data on the incidence of trials not as an end in itself, but as 
an indication that we need to pay attention now.   We will see below that some of the more 
likely explanations of the trial’s decline understand it as a kind of self-sustaining and, 
indeed, accelerating process.  The fear here is, of course, that we may reach a point where 
we actually lose the ability to retain this important element of our public culture, even if 
we want to.7  And the numbers make it clear that the word “death” is not too strong a word. 
 
 Marc Galanter and Angela Frozena have recently updated previous work to bring 
the data up to 2009.8  With regard to civil trials in the federal courts, they conclude that 
there is “no news” and “big news.”  The “no news” is that the half-century old downward 
trend lines continue.  The “big news” is that the civil trial in the federal courts is 
approaching extinction.  Here is a very brief summary of the most illuminating statistics 
from both Galanter’s earlier and his more recent work.  In 1938, about 20% of federal civil 
cases went to trial.  By 1962, the percentage was down to 12%.  By 2009, the number has 
                                                 
7 The analogy with global warming is inevitable.  At a certain point in the process, it becomes irreversible.  
That it is a natural process in the case of global warming and an institutional and social process in the case of 
the loss of the trial doesn’t really matter. 
8 Marc Galanter and Angela Frozena, “ ‘A grin without a cat’ “Civil Trials in the Federal Courts,” 




sunk to 1.7%.  The percentage of jury trials in federal civil cases was down to just under 
1%, and the percentage of bench trials was even lower.9  So between 1938 and 2009, there 
was a decline in the percentage of civil cases going to trial of over 90% and the pace of the 
decline was accelerating toward the end of that period, until very recently, when there was 
almost literally, no further decline possible.  Even civil rights cases, where the personal 
quality of the perceived injury creates a somewhat higher likelihood of trial, had an 
incidence of trial that fell from 20% in 1970 to 4% in 2002.10  The percentage of federal 
criminal cases going to trial fell from 15% in 1962 to 5% in 2002.  One more localized 
study of a federal district court found that in 1975 twice as many civil cases were resolved 
after trial than by summary judgment; by 2000, in the same district three times as many 
cases were resolved by summary judgment as by trial.  So in that district the rate of cases 
“disposed of,” to use a telling metaphor, by summary judgment rose by 350%.  In the new 
federal courthouse in Boston, about which more later, there were only about seven or eight 
trials per courtroom per year.  By 2009, there were fewer than six civil trials and about five 
criminal trials per federal judge per year.  And these trials were not generally long: they 
averaged about two days each.  State statistics are harder to come by, but they showed a 
similar pattern.  In the ten years between 1992 and 2001, the number of trials in the 
seventy-five most populous counties fell by about 50% (though the number of filed cases 
was actually increasing).11  In the criminal context, from 1976 to 2002, the percentage of 
cases tried by judge or jury fell over 60%.12   
 
                                                 
9 Id.  
10 Marc Galanter, “The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State 
Courts,” 1 J. EMP. LEGAL STUDIES 459, 468 (2004). 
11 Id. at 480. 
12 BURNS, supra note 1 at 82-88.  
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 The trial seems to be the only part of the legal system that is shrinking.  There were 
more statutes, more regulations, more case law, more cases, more lawyers, more judges 
and a higher percentage of GDP going to legal matters.13  And so it is shocking that even 
the absolute numbers of federal civil trials is decreasing, from about twelve thousand in 
1985 to about 3200 in 2009.  The ratio of trials to filings is about 8% of what it was in 
1962.  And these numbers are generous, because they include as “trials” cases where trial 
begins, but are not tried to judgment, and all evidentiary hearings, for example, hearings on 
preliminary injunctions.14  Judith Resnick gives us a graphic architectural portrayal of the 
growing discontinuity between our traditional assumption that the trial was “the central 
institution of the law as we know it,”15 the sun around which all our procedural planets 
revolve, and the reality of the way cases are actually handled.  She describes the new 
federal court house in Boston: 
In this courthouse, some twenty trial courts look more or less alike: a 
judge’s bench is placed at the back, a bit lower than is common, in a self-
conscious (if subtle) effort to portray law as accessible and not unduly 
hierarchical.  Each wall has an arch of equal height, to suggest the equality 
of all before the law.  The designers of the courthouse chose the arches and 
the courtroom as central icons of their building….Yet a disjuncture exists 
between this new building, its courtrooms, and the rules and practices that 
now surround processes, which have also been reshaped many times during 
the twentieth century.  Judges are now multitaskers, sometimes managers of 
lawyers and cases, sometimes mediators and sometimes referral sources, 
sending people outside of courts to alternative dispute resolution by judges 
and lawyers….When that courthouse opened in 1998 in the District of 
Massachusetts, 142 civil and 48 criminal trials were completed.  With 
approximately twenty-five trial courtrooms for district and magistrate 
judges available, about seven or eight trials were held per courtroom per 
year in the new courthouse.16 
 
                                                 
13 Id. at 88.  
14 Galanter & Frozena, supra note 8. 
15 JAMES BOYD WHITE, FROM EXPECTATION TO EXPERIENCE: ESSAYS ON LAW & LEGAL 
EDUCATION (1999), 108.  
16 Judith Resnick, “Whither and Whether Adjudication?”  86 B.U.L.REV 1122, 1126 (2006).   
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III. What Are We Losing? 
 A good deal of my effort over the years has been directed at showing what the trial 
is for us.17  This is primarily a task of description and interpretation, one necessary to undo 
the effects of TV drama and well-financed public-relations campaigns.  The point of this 
description is to convey a sense of the power of trial practices and languages to illuminate 
in a unique way the human action that always provides the subject matter of legal cases.  
Anthropologist Clifford Geertz has argued that real insight into social events requires “a 
continuous dialectical tacking between the most local of local detail and the more global of 
global structures in a way as to bring both into view simultaneously.”18  To understand the 
trial’s importance for us, we need to pay very close attention to the languages and practices 
that prevail at trial and also ask more “philosophical questions” about the significance of 
this “most local of local detail.”  For me, the conviction that the trial was a great cultural 
achievement came not mainly from academic reflection, but rather from the “radical 
empiricism” of actually trying criminal and civil cases.  (That is why I, with some 
trepidation, used an old theological term, fides quaerens intellectum, “faith seeking 
understanding,” for my account of the trial.  The more theoretical account was an attempt 
at an interpretation and an understanding of a practice whose power I had already 
experienced.)  I think this trial lawyer’s experience leading to respect for the trial is hardly 
unique.  Yes, it is true that trying cases can be exhilarating and, for some, remunerative.  In 
their reflective moments, however, trial lawyers value the experience of participating in a 
                                                 
17 See e.g., ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL (1999); Robert P. Burns, “The Lawfulness of 
the American Trial,”  38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 205 (2001).                           . 
18 Clifford Geertz, “From the Native’s Point of View: On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding,” in 
INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE: A READER (Paul Rabinow & William M. Sullivan, eds.) (1979), 
239. 
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public enterprise that, astoundingly, can often actually converge on a fair understanding of 
the human action that is always at the center of any case and can point the way to a fair 
grasp of what should be done about it.19  We are the stewards of that great cultural 
achievement.  Doctor Johnson told us that we are “more frequently required to be 
reminded than informed.”20 The lawyers and law students who are the most likely readers 
of this essay need only a little reminding of what the trial is in its local detail.  I shall set 
about to do just that.   
 
 The trial proceeds from opening statements through the plaintiff’s21 case-in-chief to 
the defendant’s case-in-chief then (sometimes) on to the plaintiff’s then the defendant’s 
rebuttal cases.  The cases are usually followed by a jury instruction conference, then 
closing arguments, and finally the reading of the instructions to the jury.  Generally, the 
trial works through the construction, then the deconstruction, then the attempted 
reconstruction of very different kinds of narrative.  The fully characterized narratives of 
opening statements, where each lawyer has significant freedom to tell the jury what he or 
she thinks “this case is about” are deconstructed by the very juxtaposition of competing 
narratives and then ultimately by the destructive or critical aspects of closing argument.22  
The much more legally constrained narratives of each direct examination can immediately 
be deconstructed by the cross-examination that follows.  This rhythm allows the jury both 
to see how things hang together, to see the coherence of each side’s case, the only way 
                                                 
19 Recall the testimony of Tom Hanks’ character in Philadelphia about why he loves the law. See BURNS, 
supra note 17 at 220-40. 
20 Johnson, Rambler #2 (March 24, 1750). 
21 For ease of reference, I shall call the party with the burden of proof the “plaintiff,” even when referring to 
criminal cases. 
22 One of the rhetorical commonplaces of closing argument is to maintain that the opposing lawyer has 
“broken his promise” to supply evidence to support the important claims he has made. 
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discursive intellects like ours can work, but also to grasp the willfulness that inevitably 
goes into adversary story-telling, to understand how the common sense generalizations out 
of which they are built up are just a bit overgeneralized and the stories just a little too 
good.  This extraordinarily disciplined discourse is enormously more demanding than are 
the usually lazy interchanges of press conferences and Congressional hearings and the 
inevitably single-voiced accounts of even the best journalism.  
 
 Many of the legal restraints or formalities regulating the presentation of evidence 
are really quite simple.23  They are far from being hypertechnical and serve important 
public purposes.  The notion of materiality keeps the presentation of evidence loosely 
tethered24 to the “law of rules”25 embedded in the substantive law and serves to protect the 
democratic legitimacy of the rule of law.  And so it protects the liberal values surrounding 
both predictability and the constraint of official discretion.26  They make planning possible.  
The requirement of foundation as to personal knowledge27 and the derivative imperative 
that testimony be, to the extent feasible,28 in “the language of perception,” allows the jury 
to understand the basis of any witness’s assertion before actually hearing that assertion.  It 
imposes a kind of orderliness in the presentation of testimony and allows for a defter 
interpretation of the entire case presented. 
 
                                                 
23 I cannot say the same for all of the sometimes byzantine rules of evidence.  See Robert P. Burns, “Notes on 
the Future of Evidence Law,” 74 TEMPLE L. REV. 69 (2001). 
24 For an account of  why I say “loosely tethered,” see BURNS, supra note 17 at 26-33. 
25 Antonin Scalia, “The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,”   
26 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (     ). 
27 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 602. 
28 Id. at Rule 701. 
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 In a well-tried case, this “consciously structured hybrid” of languages and 
performances can realize a usually dormant, but extremely rich and subtle, democratic 
common sense.29  In my view, much of the media serves as a kind of paralyzing narcotic 
for this capacity for democratic governance.30 The discipline of trial language, by contrast, 
facilitates real insight into the persons and events being tried.  Judge William Dwyer 
emphasized this elevating power of the trial’s devices: 
My admiration for the jury, strong while I was [a] trial lawyer, has only 
deepened during my service as a judge.  Imperfect and battle-scared though 
it is, the jury, as I see it, still is able to reach fair and honest verdicts, to say 
“no” to official power when that word must be uttered for the sake of 
freedom, and to legitimize hard decisions for a questioning public.  It still 
“contributes most powerfully,” as Tocqueville wrote a hundred at sixty-five 
years ago, “to form the judgment and increase the natural intelligence of the 
people.”  And it sheds light on two other democratic institutions, the ballot 
box and the initiative and referendum.  If jury trials as a rule produce 
sounder results than we can count in elections—which I believe they do—
one reason may be the quality of information given to citizens who must 
decide.  In contrast to the chaos and mendacity of much political 
campaigning, and to the scattergun delivery of thirty-second television 
commercials, a jury hears testimony that is kept to the point by an impartial 
referee, tested by cross-examination, and offered throughout the day.  We 
should be able to learn something valuable from the differences in 
communication.31 
 
It is challenging to give an adequate account of the simultaneous grasp of facts, norms, and 
possibilities for action that the trial can occasion and to demonstrate how the trial can be 
both a conservative institution and yet one suited to contemporary needs.32   
 
                                                 
29 See David J. Smigelskis, “Realizing the Pratical Intelligence of American Juries,” 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1015 
(2001). 
30 On the republican tradition at the basis of American institutions, see HANNAH ARENDT, ON 
REVOLUTION (1963). 
31 WILLIAM DWYER, IN THE HANDS OF THE PEOPLE: THE TRIAL JURY’S ORIGINS, TRIUMPHS, 
TROUBLE, AND FUTURE IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2002), xiii. 
32 For my attempt, see BURNS, supra note 17. 
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 As I noted, the trial proceeds by the construction and attempted destruction of 
different sorts of narratives.33 The narrative of openings invites each jury to see “what this 
case is about,” in a contract case, for example, to see it as about a broken promise or, as an 
act of disloyalty, or as a simple misunderstanding.  Our moral sensibilities are closely 
intertwined with all of the stories that are likely told in opening statement, each of which 
implicitly invokes a more or less powerful norm, beginning the process by which the jury 
is required to make a judgment not only as to which factual account is more likely, but also 
which moral or legal norm is the more important.   
 
 Not that factual accuracy is unimportant.  The trial is actually obsessive in 
exploring the details of what has occurred, because details matter in serious cases.  And so 
the demanding strictures that are imposed on direct examination provide relatively reliable 
elements from which an accurate factual narrative can be built up, but also allow the jury 
to refine the more general norms that are embedded in the broader narratives of opening 
statement.  And cross-examination can serve to demonstrate that even the apparently 
chaste and “factual” narratives of direct examination themselves have an element of 
willfulness about them, apparent in both the remaining characterizations that the witness 
chooses and the inevitable selectivity and ordering of the facts recounted.   
 
 So the trial respects detailed factual truth, the subtle moral sensibilities of common 
sense, and the “the rule of law as a law of rules.”  More controversially, though deeply 
                                                 
33 See Robert P. Burns, “The Distinctiveness of Trial Narrative,” in THE TRIAL ON TRIAL, eds. Antony 
Duff et al. (2005). 
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rooted in our history and traditions,34 the trial allows the jury to judge that the most 
important aspect of the case is not the maintenance of formal legality, but something else.  
The latter judgment rarely takes the form of overt nullification, though it sometimes does.  
It may be that the jury concludes that the law as written fails to capture what is most 
morally salient about the case or, despite its literal meaning, could not have been intended 
to apply to this set of circumstances, or, more rarely still, is simply unjust in all or most 
applications.  Or the jury may conclude that the most important aspect of the case is the 
opportunity it presents to “send a message” to the police or prosecutors who used offensive 
methods to bring the case to trial.  More often, it will involve simply seeing the case in a 
way that takes it outside the meaning of the written law, as the latter might be interpreted 
without the benefit of the devices of the trial.  
 
 It is the trial’s fierce oppositions, its differences in role and differences in language, 
that create almost unbearable intellectual and emotional tensions.  These tensions in 
performance and role reflect real tensions in our values and forms of life.  For us, the 
resolution of these tensions deftly in a particular case is what justice, and I would say, law, 
actually are.35  The trial is, for us, the crucible of democracy. 
 
IV.  Some Guesses as to the Cause of the Trial’s Decline 
 I have argued that explanations are dangerous when it comes to political issues.  
There is always the danger that isolating a “cause” of a political, social, or legal 
                                                 
34 JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 
(1994). 
35 STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT (1999); James Boyd White, “An Old-Fashioned View 
of the Nature of Law,” 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRES IN LAW 381 (2011). 
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development will implicitly assume one form or other of determinism and lead to fatalism 
and paralysis.  The better the explanation, the greater the temptation to resignation and 
passivity.  When the “cause” itself is well-established in our actual institutions and 
practices, and the link between cause and effect seems strong, it is easy to think of the 
effect as an inevitable effect, a kind of “false necessity.”  We become resigned when we 
should be activist.  In the final analysis, our legislatures and appellate courts will decide 
whether the trial lives or dies.  And I believe that our legislatures and appellate courts 
remain “spaces of freedom” where conviction and courage can lead to the kind of action 
which can reverse the current decline of the trial. 
 
 We are just beginning to understand the forces that have led us to our current plight 
and so all arguments must be tentative.36  In general, we can try to understand the trial’s 
decline by looking though a microscope or a telescope.  Each form of visual enhancement 
has its own strength.  “Microscopic” explanations tend to look at specific beliefs or 
incentives possessed by important actors in the legal order.  “Telescopic” explanations 
place the phenomenon in a broader social or institutional context and tend to see it as a 
reflection of larger forces.  Microscopic explanations are preferred by the foxes among us, 
the telescopic by our hedgehogs.   
 
 First, the microscopic explanations.  Galanter and Frozena have written recently 
that “the decline has become institutionalized in the practice and expectations of judges, 
administrators, lawyers, and parties.”37 There appears to have been a continuing change in 
                                                 
36 For a fuller inventory of possible causes, see BURNS, supra note 1 at 88-101. 
37 Galanter & Frozena, supra note 8.  
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the culture of judging in the direction of “managerial judging.”  Stephen Yeazall has 
stressed the ways in which modern procedural rules have bestowed on the trial judge 
enormous and effectively unreviewable discretion to make important decisions shaping the 
outcome of the cases before them: “[T]he discretion of trial judges has expanded partly 
because of increased complexity, but even more so from the multiplication of discretionary 
procedural, evidentiary, and management decisions.”38   Galanter noted one effect of this 
development by quoting a Colorado Supreme Court judge: “While an appellate court may 
have the opportunity to reverse any individual trial judge every few years, I know that trial 
judges, in their numerous workday rulings, reverse appellate courts every day.”39   
Deferential standards of review and prohibitions on interlocutory review effectively 
insulate these decisions from reversal.  Managerial judging has become something of an 
ideal in much of our legal culture: “[I]nfluential judges and administrators in the federal 
courts embraced the notion that judges were problem solvers and case managers as well as 
adjudicators.”40  And so judges 
shifted from an understanding that their role was to move cases toward trial 
(with settlement a welcome by-product of these efforts) to a view that it was 
their job to resolve disputes; they also embraced process pluralism—i.e., the 
notion that there was more than one right way to deal with a dispute—and 
accordingly they welcome “alternative processes in the courts and in forums 
outside the courts.41 
 
                                                 
38 Stephen C. Yeazell, “The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Procedure,” 1994 WISC. L. REV. 
631.  
39 Marc Galanter, “The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State 
Courts,” 1 J. EMP. LEGAL STUDIES (2004) 459, 519, quoting Gregory Kellam Scott, “Judge-Made Law: 
Constitutional Duties and Obligations Under the Separations of Powers Doctrine,” 49 DEPAUL L. REV.517 
(1999). 
 
40 Galanter, supra note 28 at 5. 
41 Marc Galanter, “A World without Trials?” J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2006) 12, 20-21. 
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Not only have many judges become pluralists, they have become pluralists with a 
presumption against trial.  “The ‘normative valence’ of going to trial has changed, as 
leaders of the bench and bar bemoan the need to take cases to trial.”42  As one federal 
judge put it, “”One of the fundamental principles of judicial administration is that, in most 
cases, the absolute result of a trial is not as high a quality of justice as is the freely 
negotiated, give a little, take a little settlement.”43  Or, as it is sometimes said more 
succinctly, “A bad settlement is almost always better than a good trial.”   Bentham was 
right in saying, “Publicity is the vary soul of justice…It keeps the judge himself, while 
trying, on trial.”44  One can see why some judges might be inclined to avoid that kind of 
scrutiny. 
 
 The culture of lawyering has also had an effect.  Fewer “litigators” are comfortable 
trying cases.  This is, of course, a self-sustaining development.  As fewer young lawyers 
try  (usually small) cases early in their careers, they may become wary about trying more 
important cases as they get older.  The process of discovery and the pretrial motion 
practice that accompanies it can become an end in itself.  And it can become endless, as 
fewer lawyers have a sense of when they have learned enough to try the case effectively.  
There is little doubt, too, that the billable hour contributes to this process, as lawyers have 
incentives to continue the pretrial process rather than undergo the higher levels of stress 
that surround trial.   
 
                                                 
42 Judith Resnik, “Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing: The Empirical and Normative Puzzles of Declining 
Trial Rates in Courts,” 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 811 (2004). 
43 Hubert L. Will, Robert R. Merhige, Jr., & Alvin B. Rubin, “The Role of the Judge in the Settlement 
Process,” 75 F.R.D. 203, 203 (1978). 
44 Resnick, supra note 31 at 831 n. 234. 
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 Another microscopic explanation of the trial’s decline emphasizes the increasing 
ease with cases can be “disposed of,” to use that telling metaphor, through “dispositive” 
pretrial rulings.  A key development in this process was the Supreme Court’s liberalization 
of the standards for granting summary judgment over two decades ago.45  More recently, 
the Court has raised the level of specificity necessary to survive a motion to dismiss.  
Plaintiffs must now pass some relatively undefined notion of “plausibility” before being 
permitted even to begin discovery.46  This latter may affect many civil rights actions, 
where the plaintiff is required to prove intent, leading to the early dismissal of precisely the 
cases more likely to go to trial than standard commercial cases.  Additionally, there has 
been the intensification of the plea bargaining system47 and the ever-increasing support of 
the federal courts for diverting cases into arbitration.48 
 
 If one looks through a telescope, rather than a microscope, there are more systemic 
and theoretical “big-picture” explanations for the trial’s decline.  The trial has always been 
a realm apart from other social systems, with distinctive rules and rituals which resist the 
simple importation of power relationships existing in the broader economic and social 
worlds.  It has provided a distinct region where a citizen may appeal to legal rules or moral 
sensibilities.  The notion here is that the law is becoming more a creature of the 
bureaucratic and market institutions that surround it.  Managerial judging is discretionary 
and bureaucratic, as is the dismissal of cases based on the intuition of a judicial official that 
                                                 
45 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S. 574 (1986);  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).  
46 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 1295 S.Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
47 GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN 
AMERICA (2003). 
48 Most recently, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011) (Federal Arbitration Act 
preempts California rule that class action arbitration waivers are unconscionable).  
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the complaint is not “plausible.”   These intuitions are schooled by elite ideology and 
experience.  Increasing the pressure to settle by increasing the costs of litigation allows the 
prior distribution of resources to determine the results of legal cases.  The resulting picture 
is not pretty.  It is of a more bureaucratic and monolithic society where there are fewer 
countervailing institutions balanced against our corporate and private bureaucracies. 
 
 Then there are explanations that focus on the enormous democratization that has 
occurred over the past half-century in the composition of the American jury, through the 
operation of both statute and constitutional adjudication.  As I noted above, the trial 
invokes the common-sense life world norms of the jury.  If legal limitations on access to 
participation in the jury can keep it from being truly cross-sectional, the resulting elite 
composition of the jury may blunt the discontinuity between life-world norms and those 
that prevail in other power centers.  As the jury becomes more democratic, the tensions 
between its distinctive mode of social ordering and those than prevail in other social 
systems may become close to intolerable, leading to various forms of pressure to reduce its 
significance in the legal order.49  The latter would then, consistent with the prior 
“telescopic” explanation of the trial’s decline, become more congruent with other social 
systems. 
 
V. The Meanings of the Trial’s Disappearance 
 My goal here is simply to enumerate, with some elaboration, what the trial has 
meant to us and what we stand to lose with its disappearance.  First, we would lose an 
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institution where the equitable judgments50 occasioned by attention to the details of a 
particular situation moderate the harshness of the law of rules.  Kalven and Zeisel’s great 
study of the American jury noticed that that jurors made distinctions that the written law 
did not, for example, that the defendant had already suffered injury or that the victim was 
disinclined to prosecute or that the crime was hardly ever prosecuted or that the defendant 
in an armed robbery used a toy gun rather than a real gun.51 Thomas Green, in an important 
work,52 maintained that it was the face-to-face nature of the English trial that made it 
impossible completely to forget that the law was somehow about justice, something that is 
easier to forget when we are just shuffling papers.  The devices of the trial and the lay jury 
here complement one another.  The jurors, unlike a judge who can simply get too used to it 
all, can actually allow the languages of the trial to affect them, to “get inside them.”  
Chesteron put it best: 
The trend of our epoch up to this time has been consistently toward 
specialism and professionalism….Many legalists have declared that the 
untrained jury should be altogether supplanted by the trained 
judge….[However,] the more a man looks at a thing, the less he sees it, and 
the more a man learns a thing the less he knows it….[T]he man who is 
trained …goes on seeing less and less of its significance….Now it is a 
terrible business to mark a man out for the judgment of men.  But it is a 
thing to which a man can grow accustomed, as he can to other terrible 
things….And the horrible thing about all legal officials, even the best, about 
all judges, magistrates, barristers, detectives, and policemen, is not that they 
are wicked (some of them are good), not that they are stupid (several of 
them are quite intelligent), it is simply that they have got used to 
it….Strictly they do not see the prisoner in the dock; all they see is the usual 
man in the usual place.  They do not see the awful court of judgment; they 
only see their own workshop.  Therefore the instinct of Christian 
civilization has most wisely declared that into their judgments there shall 
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upon every occasion be infused fresh blood and fresh thoughts from the 
streets. 53 
 
Delegate Benjamin Butler to the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1953 
expressed a similar notion: 
Which is the best tribunal to try [a] case? This man who sits upon the 
bench, and who…has nothing in common with the people; who has hardly 
seen a common man in twenty years….Is he the better man to try the case 
than they who have the same stake in the community, with their wives, and 
children, and their fortunes, depending on the integrity of the verdicts they 
shall render?54 
  
 We would also a lose a distinctively American forum where a citizen can tell his 
own story in a public forum, with the help of a spokesperson whose particular gift is the 
power to translate private interests into public appeals, and then, subject to rules designed 
to assure relevance and reliability, choose what evidence to submit to support that story.  
The maxim Audiatur et altera pars (“Let the other side be heard!”) is the first principle of 
adversary justice.  Telling one’s own story is important: “No philosophy, no analysis, no 
aphorism, be it ever so profound, can compete in intensity and richness with a properly 
narrated story.”55 In the American trial, it is the party who both chooses what opening 
statement to make, to tell the jury “what this case is about,” what norms to appeal to, and 
who is also given the means to support the story told.  This is in quite marked contrast to 
continental reliance on the examining magistrate to frame the issue, determine the scope of 
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discovery, and usually to dominate the questioning at trial.56  In some ways that may be 
appropriate for somewhat more homogeneous, organic, and hierarchical societies, but it 
would be inconsistent with our broader institutions.57  The trial’s vanishing would reduce 
the space for effective speech in the United States. 
 
 In his classic article on the merits of adversary adjudication,58 Lon Fuller 
emphasized the relative rigor and rationalism with which adjudication addresses questions 
of basic fact, what Arendt called “brutally elementary” factual questions.  The devices of 
the trial are organized specifically to elevate the concrete, the factual and the multiple.59 
“No ideas but in things!”60  This obsessive concern with the details of the factual context 
serves as a critique of lazy over-generalized abstractions, but it also emphasizes the 
importance of simple accuracy.  As Bentham, put it, falsehood is the “handmaiden” of 
injustice.61 
 
 We would also lose an important vehicle for citizen self-governance.  DeToqueville 
celebrated the jury as the device which “rubs off that private selfishness which is the rust 
of society.”62   In his view, it could instill in citizen-jurors a kind of “respect for the thing 
judged and the notion of right[,]” an actual experience of one’s moral and political nature.  
Its participation in the “spirit of magistracy”63 could produce not just alienated critics of 
                                                 
56 BURNS, supra note 1 at 115.  
57 Id. at 116.  
58 Lon L. Fuller, “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978). 
59 BURNS, supra note 17 at 125-30.  
60 WILLIAM CARLOS WILLIAMS, PATERSON (1951), 14. 
61 JEREMY BENTHAM, 1 RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 22 (1827) [1978]. 
62 ALEXIS deTOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 295 (trans. Henry Reeve) (1945). 
63 Id. 
 20
public affairs, but persons who bear the responsibility for the always constrained choices 
that have to be made.  
 
 The trial’s vanishing would transfer political authority away from the increasingly 
well-educated, literate, and informed citizens64 who sit on American juries to public and 
corporate bureaucratic elites: 
The vanishing trial is, in many regards, the vanishing jury.  Power and 
discretion have shifted away from the jury and more and more now is in the 
hands of the judge.  To put it another way, the long-term historical 
development is to shift decision making from amateurs to professionals.  
The jury decides few felony cases; prosecutors and public defenders to it 
now, in the process of plea bargaining.  Lawyers and the parties dicker and 
settle.65 
 
Blackstone, whom no one can accuse of being a populist, understood the jury as a 
corrective to the inevitable elitism of the judiciary, whose “decisions, in spite of their own 
natural integrity, will have frequently an involuntary bias toward those of their own rank 
and dignity; it is not to be expected from human nature that the few should always be 
attentive to the interests and good of the many.”66   
 
 The death of the trial would also distort the process of settlement.  It would be the 
case that in more and more areas, “all cases settle.”  Cases would be evaluated not based 
on a history of adjudication, but on a history of prior settlements, going back to a time 
where the mind of man runneth not to the contrary.  Paul Butler has suggested that this 
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pressure to bargain away every principle is corrosive, suggesting that we either have no 
principles or have not the means by which to implement them.67  And transforming too 
many settlement offers into “Offers that they can’t refuse,” given the often punitive costs 
of going to trial, also breeds cynicism about basic institutions. 
 
 The trial’s disappearance would eliminate face-to-face drama from our legal order. 
I have already mentioned Thomas Green’s argument that the face-to-face nature of the trial 
kept the idea of justice alive in English law.  The elimination of the trial would cause us to 
feel and understand less about each case.  Stephen Burbank, a tough-minded empiricist 
himself, has concluded that recent trends must convince “even the most hard-hearted 
empiricist that some litigants in some types of cases in some courts are not receiving 
reasonable opportunities to present their cases.”68  Without face-to-face encounter, we lose 
an opportunity to respond to a concrete person: 
Such a response points to a hidden foundation, a mythic core that is 
repressed by the commodified images of positive law’s unreflective, 
outward gaze.  Behind what John Noonan referred to as the mask of the law 
lies its hidden, ethical foundation: the repressed poetics of Justice….The 
associative, affective logic of visual images help us escape the disembodied 
logic or instrumental reasoning.  When the flesh of the image … arouses 
and transforms the viewer’s heart and soul…it invokes law’s hidden source, 
which is Justice….Standing face to face, the neighbor calls us.  In our 
response to that primary ethical calling we affirm our ethical nature ….69 
 
Judge Patricia Wald has pointed to the dangers of more and more of our law being 
developed in the context of summary judgments.70 As Burbank notes, “the law developed 
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in the context of summary judgment will be arid, divorced from the full factual context that 
has in the past given our law life and the capacity to grow.”71  The dramatic quality of the 
trial cannot be replaced by summary proceedings: 
But the trial is not only oral, it is dramatic. It involves conversations among 
lawyers, witnesses, and the court, all of which are performances.  The 
performances are often adversarial and manifest the tensions among the 
plays within the constraints of the ordinary language in which these 
struggles take place.  At trial, as in drama, freedom encounters freedom.  
Some things cannot be plausibly said, and the tenor of the interpersonal 
relations themselves is revealing.  The drama is engrossing: it forces us to 
dwell within the tensions among the participants.  It actualizes our powerful 
tacit powers of sensibility to grant insight “into the world’s embracing 
horizon of meaning, within which a complex actions unfolds, illuminated 
and judged by it.” It allows us to “think toward the truth ‘from the middle’ 
of our creaturely existence….What Bentley says about threater is true for 
trials—that “the little ritual of performance, given just a modicum of 
competence, can lend to the events represented another dimension, a more 
urgent reality” that overcomes that lazy or bureaucratic indifference that is, 
indeed, the “rust of society.”72 
 
 There would be two further related developments.  The death of the trial would 
render the systems on which we rely more automatic, more “self-regulating.”  The most 
dramatic example is our economic system, which we have recently learned is not so 
benignly self-regulating, at least not in the public interest.  There would be fewer structures 
imposed by the legal system (and common sense norms) within which the systems world 
operated and which it had to respect.  “Because legal practices, most dramatically the 
American trial, partake of the richer normative order of the life world, they may impose 
limits on what our systems, following their own inexorable logic may do.”73 As one social 
theorist put it: 
The law serves as some kind of pivot or transmission belt between lifeworld 
and systems. The life world is the (potential) site or a loosely connected 
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network of non-institutionalized discourse in which collective self-
reflection and self-definition takes place.  The law institutionalizes the 
channels (in the form of political and legal procedures) and provides a 
language or medium (in the form of binding norms) through which the 
results of these informal deliberative processes can become socially binding 
and effective—and can to a certain degree constrain and regulate the 
“systems.”74 
 
One can sneer at “regulation by litigation,” but in the United States, with its relatively 
week regulatory system, litigation in general and trials in particular are crucial institutions 
for keeping our systems from turning against us.75  In less happy lands, the notion that the 
basic structure of society is “beyond good and evil,” to be known, if at all, by purely 
scientific means, has produced catastrophic results.76  The continued vitality of the trial is 
an important antidote to those modes of thought.  
 
 A related consequence of the trial’s disappearance would be the increasing 
bureaucratization of American society.  Corporate bureaucracies rationally organized to 
achieve (sometimes short term) profit maximization would be less qualified.  We would 
have to rely more completely on our often politically beleaguered administrative agencies 
to control the latter.  And even within the legal system itself, formalistic modes of 
adjudication, which parallel bureaucratic decision-making, would be less qualified.  
Bureaucratic modes of social ordering seek “to exclude questions of value or preference as 
obviously irrelevant to the administrative task, and it would view reliance on 
nonreplicable, nonreviewable judgment or intuition as a singularly unattractive method for 
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decision.”77 Insofar as a bureaucratic apparatus grinds forward mechanically and 
inexorably we may end up with what Hannah Arendt has famously called an irresponsible 
“rule by nobody.” 
 
 It is unlikely, however, in many cases that general rules really do decide particular 
cases. Instead of a mechanical system deciding cases deductively, what we will probably 
have in many cases are judges deciding cases in the interstices of complex rules which do 
not themselves decide the case.  Unlike the devices of the trial, which can really “get 
inside” the decision-maker and whose moral sources actually can trump the subjectivity of 
a lone decision-maker, complex patterns of jurisdictional, procedural, evidentiary, and 
substantive rules can invite manipulation by a Cartesian judge viewing those rules from a 
distance.  After all, as Judge Posner, put it, “There is almost no legal outcome that a really 
skillful legal analyst cannot cover over with legal varnish” at least “when the law is 
uncertain and emotions aroused.”78  The grim picture that thus emerges from the trial’s 
disappearance is a bureaucratized world where the run of cases are ground out by an 
irresponsible mechanism and the remaining cases “when the law is uncertain and emotions 
aroused” by the untutored subjectivity or political commitments of the judge.   
 
 There is another effect of the declining importance of public processes of 
adjudication.  We are continuing to lose a major source of public information on important 
questions of general concern.  Many arbitrations are not public and settlements are often 
private and sealed.  “As long as courts continue to be places that provide public data in 
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volume and kind outstripping that produced about adjudication in administrative agencies, 
and as long as private providers do not regularly disseminate information about or provide 
access to their processes,” then “with the declining trial rate comes a diminution of public 
knowledge of disputes, of the behavior of judges, and of the forging in public of normative 
responses to discord.”79   This decline can erode our sense of common norms.  After all, 
“[c]ourtroom procedure becomes a common language through which a secular society 
honors its democratic heritage and applies its values (in particular that of fundamental 
fairness) to human transactions” where “[l]lawyers and the rituals they observe, can be 
critical players in this process.”80  The trial contains precisely those elements which the 
procedural justice literature identifies as important for the perception of justice.81 
 
 Finally, the death of the trial would eliminate more than knowledge about the 
particular dispute: 
Landsman has noted that that “[l]awsuits against the tobacco industry and 
gunmakers and, recently, the fast-food industry, inspire more public debate 
about tort law than hours of ‘issues’ advertisement or scholarly articles.” 
The death of the trial would also remove a source of disciplined information 
about matters of public significance: “The risks posed by asbestos, 
cigarettes, and a host of other items would not have been broadcast without 
the sharing of information obtained in litigation and disseminated at trial.” 
Bogus has emphasized that companies that were successful for years at 
keeping regulators at bay finally had to accede to the compulsory process of 
discovery and adverse examination of defense witnesses at trial.82 
 
Historically, public trials have been important sources of information and crucibles or 
debate for some of the most important public issues that have arisen in our history: from 
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fugitive slaves and slavery itself to labor unrest and sweatshop conditions to political 
radicalism in the period after the First World War and again in the sixties.83  We would be 
the much poorer in our understanding of these events without what we have learned from 
the public trials that illuminated them.  Those trials were an important part of our national 
character.   
 
 The death of the trial would then have multiple meanings for us.  It poses a major 
crisis for the legal profession today, one that I hope we have the collective vision and 
courage to address: 
It would eliminate a forum where equitable considerations moderate the 
rigor of the law of rules.  It would deprive us a distinctively American 
forum where a citizen can tell his own story in public and offer the evidence 
to make it effective.  It would destroy a space where serious attention is 
paid to simple factual truth.  It would reduce serious citizen participation in 
self government and likely damage the authority of the entire judicial 
branch. It would roll back the hard-earned enfranchisement of women and 
minorities.  It would transfer power to political and technical elites.  It 
would distort the norms for settlement and have a corrosive effect on our 
sense of real freedom to reach compromise.  It would destroy the traditional 
relationship between face-to-face proceedings and the notion that legal 
proceedings were somehow about justice.  And by squeezing drama out of 
those proceedings, it would impoverish the range of cognitive capacities we 
deploy in the law.  We would both feel and see less.  The death of the trial 
would compress into a monolith the variety of and tensions among our 
modes of social ordering.  They could no longer qualify or redeem each 
other.  We would have less freedom to address pressing issues in different 
ways. 
    In particular, the death of the trial would render our economic systems 
more automatic and beyond qualification by ordinary moral norms.  It 
would mean the end of our ability incrementally to adjust our basic 
structures by norms that have their homes in other parts of our social world.  
The death of the trial would create a more bureaucratized world.  It would 
also create a world in which judges could exercise more raw discretion in 
the interstices of complex legal rules unstructured and unqualified by the 
objectivity of the real social norms that the trial realizes.  It would mean the 
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end of an irreplaceable public forum and would mean that more of the legal 
order would proceed behind closed doors.  And it would deprive us, 
American citizens, of an important source of knowledge about ourselves 
and key issues of public concern.84 
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